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Forecasting Inflation via Experimental Stock Markets 
Some Results from Pilot Markets 
Abstract 
 
While there are various techniques of inflation forecasting in use, none of them has 
proved to deliver consistently more accurate forecasts than the others. That is why most 
users of inflation forecasts monitor a variety of inflation indicators and forecasts and 
check them for consistency. This paper aims at contributing to an extension of the 
methods in use. We propose to conduct experimental inflation forecasting markets in 
order to uncover market participants' inflation expectations. While the markets directly 
deliver density forecasts of inflation they also allow to construct mean forecasts and a 
measure of forecast uncertainty. We also present evidence from a number of pilot mar-
kets underlining that the proposed method might enrich the arsenal of existing forecast-
ing techniques. 
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 2 Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets
1. Introduction
Throughout the last decade, interest in forecasting macroeconomic variables, and espe-
cially in°ation, has increased considerably. This is at least partially due to the fact that
many central banks switched to in°ation targeting strategies of monetary policy. An
essential part of these strategies is the use of in°ation forecasts as intermediate target of
monetary policy decisions.1 Thus, central banks following an in°ation targeting strategy
are in urgent need of high quality in°ation forecasts in order to be successful in achieving
their primary goal of guaranteeing a stable price level. However, due to the fact that
expectations about in°ation are embedded in planning decisions of all kinds, in°ation
forecasting is also an important matter outside central banks. The private sector is in
need of in°ation forecasts when corporations make investment decisions, corporations and
workers (or trade unions) negotiate wages or individuals make savings decisions based
on expected future real income. The public sector also cares about future in°ation, e.g.
when planning budgets.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to extending the conventional set of in°ation
forecasting techniques. We propose a new method of forecasting in°ation: assessing mar-
ket in°ation expectations via conducting experimental stock markets. Our belief that
experimental stock markets could be a useful tool is driven by the experience that
experimental political stock markets have been quite successful in predicting electoral
outcomes.2 Thus, transferring the idea to forecasting macroeconomic variables like in°a-
tion might be fruitful. We therefore develop a prototype design for in°ation forecasting
markets in this paper. We also report and analyze the results from a number of related
pilot experiments conducted in Germany.
The outline of this paper is as follows: the second section gives a brief review of
conventional forecasting techniques. In the third section we develop the design of a
prototype experimental in°ation forecasting market and show how the market data can
be used to construct both density and mean forecasts of in°ation. We also show how
1 See Svensson (1997,1999).
2 See Berg et al. (1998), Berg, Forsythe and Rietz (1997) or Berlemann and Schmidt (2001).Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets 3
the uncertainty surrounding the mean forecast can be assessed. In the fourth section we
report and analyze the results of several pilot forecasting markets conducted in Germany.
Section 5 summarizes the results.
2. Conventional in°ation forecasting techniques
Conventional in°ation forecasting techniques can roughly be subdivided into two basic
approaches: the expectations and the econometric approach. Before we outline the idea
of experimental macroeconomic forecasting markets we should give a brief overview on
conventional concepts (see ¯gure 1).3
conventional forecasting techniques








indirect measurement macroeconometric models
Figure 1. Conventional in°ation forecasting methods.
The ¯rst of the two basic approaches to forecasting in°ation is the econometric ap-
proach.4 Econometric forecasting models use actual and historical macroeconomic data
to generate forecasts. In forward-looking models even expectations on future values of
some variables can enter econometric models. Econometric forecasting models can be
divided into two subgroups: theory-dominated and atheoretic models.
The basic idea underlying theory-dominated econometric approaches is that there is
some theoretical model explaining by which factors in°ation is determined. Whenever
3 For a brief introduction to in°ation forecasting see also Tallman (1995).
4 For a detailed description of alternative econometric in°ation forecasting techniques see Bank of
England (1999).4 Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets
we believe to know the correct model and whenever we possess the necessary data we
should be able to produce some reasonable forecast of future in°ation. Due to the fact
that there is a large number of theories, explaining the causes of in°ation, econometric
in°ation forecasting models di®er in as much as the underlying theoretical models di®er.
Large-scale macroeconometric models5 try to give a reasonably complete account of the
macroeconomy. Therefore this type of model is typically highly disaggregated. However,
large-scale macroeconometric models are hard to handle. That is why often models with
higher degrees of aggregation are used. Among the most often used theory-dominated
small-scale forecasting models are Phillips curve models and P-star models. Phillips curve
models try to exploit systematic relationships between in°ation and some measure of
economic activity.6 P-star models are based on the quantity equation and relate in°ation
to both output and liquidity gaps.7
Atheoretic models of forecasting in°ation make no or only minimal use of theoretical
arguments. In the simplest case, in°ation is forecasted on the basis of past observations
of in°ation itself. Due to the fact that in°ation is somewhat persistent in°ation forecasts
based on an autoregressive model might perform quite well in the short run. While
autoregressive models focus solely on past observations of in°ation VAR models let the
empirical data determine the forecasting model's structure. However, VAR models are
not completely atheoretic but rely on only a minimum of restrictions resulting from
theoretical considerations.8
The second basic concept of forecasting in°ation, the "expectations approach", is not
concerned about the question which theory, allowing to predict future in°ation, is the
appropriate one. The basic idea of the expectations approach is that many people care -
or at least should care - about in°ation. The various forms of in°ation e®ects9 deliver the
theoretical reasoning for this argument. The expectations approach simply suggests that
5 See e.g. Bank of England (1999), Jordan and Peytrignet (2001) or Poloz, Rose and Tetlow (1994).
6 See e.g. Stoch and Watson (1999), Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) or Fisher, Liu and Zhou (2002).
7 See Hallman, Porter and Small (1991), TÄ odter and Reimers (1994), Issing and TÄ odter (1995) and
Gottschalk and BrÄ ock (2000).
8 See Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984) or Thompson and Miller (1986).
9 See e.g. Briault (1995).Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets 5
a certain subgroup of people, caring about future in°ation, knows enough about the true
determinants of price level changes to be able to predict future in°ation well on average.
Thus, it is su±cient to measure in°ation expectations of an informed subgroup without
knowing which methods are used for individual forecasts. Even if individual beliefs on
future changes in the price level might di®er heavily because of heterogenous information
sets and di®erent ways of interpreting them (i.e. individuals might use di®erent theoretical
"models" for their forecasts) the aggregate of individual expectations should be a good
predictor for future in°ation, provided that individual forecasts turn out to be rational.
However, the basic problem of the expectations approaches is how to uncover market
participants' in°ation expectations. Direct methods of measuring in°ation expectations
typically rely on some sort of expectation surveys in which certain subsamples of the
population are asked to reveal their personal in°ation expectations.10 While in some sur-
veys the respondents have to make some qualitative assessment of future in°ation, others
ask for concrete numbers. However, in both cases some appropriate way of aggregating
the individual responses has to be found. The indirect approach to asses expectations
is to derive in°ation expectations from market participants' behavior on real world
(¯nancial) markets. A straightforward way to do so is to use prices of CPI futures to
derive market expectations.11 However, in most countries markets for these futures did
not develop.12 Alternatively, several authors tried to gauge in°ation expectations from
the term structure of interest rates.13
Numerous studies analyzed the relative accuracy of in°ation forecasts generated by the
various summarized forecasting techniques.14 However, when evaluating this literature
no coherent picture can be drawn since the success of the various discussed in°ation
forecasting techniques seems to depend very much on the studied countries, sample
periods and the frequency of the available data. Several authors come to similar results
10 See e.g. Croushore (1996) or Thomas (1999).
11 Lovell and Vogel (1973) and Lioui and Poncet (2002).
12 Horrigan (1987) provides a discussion of the reasons why the attempt to establish a CPI futures
market in the United States failed.
13 See e.g. Fama (1970) or Mishkin (1990).
14 See e.g. the studies by Webb (1999), Stock and Watson (1999) or Kozicki (2001).6 Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets
when reviewing the related literature.15 It is therefore not surprising that no method of
forecasting in°ation dominates in the practice of forecasting. Even if f.ex. central banks
invest a lot of resources into econometric forecasting models they often do not completely
rely on these models' forecasts. In Bank of England (1999, p. V), George, the Bank of
England's Governor, states in this respect:
"The Bank's use of economic models is pragmatic and pluralist. In an ever-changing
economy, no single model can possibly assimilate in a comprehensive way all the
factors that matter for policy. Forming judgements about those factors, and their
implications for policy, is the job of the Committee, not something that can be
abdicated to models or even to modelers. But economic models are indispensable
tools in that process."
Thus, individual beliefs and judgments often play an important role even in in°ation
forecasts that are based upon econometric models. Most central banks therefore rely on
a mixture of the concepts and often decide somewhat discretionary on the appropriate
forecast. Regularly, there is some kind of macroeconometric model in the heart of the
forecasting system which is supplied with a number of additional smaller models that are
used to generate input data for the core model and to check the validity of its forecasts.16
In consequence, most central banks monitor a variety of in°ation indicators.17 We may
interpret this procedure as some kind of distrust in conventional forecasting methods.
Therefore further research in methods of measuring future in°ation seems to be useful
and necessary.
3. Experimental stock markets
Our proposal of conducting experimental markets to forecast in°ation builds up on the
earlier described expectations approach of forecasting in°ation. In line with Lioui and
15 See e.g. Litterman (1986) and Webb (1999).
16 Compare for example the forecasting system of the Bank of England, which is described in detail in
Bank of England (1999).
17 Kozicki (2001).Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets 7
Poncet (2002) we argue that markets are the most e±cient means of aggregating private
information.18 However, we are less optimistic that such markets will evolve in the course
of the next years in a number of countries. We therefore propose to conduct small-scale
experimental markets in which well informed individuals trade state-contingent contracts
thereby revealing their in°ation expectations. By using an appropriate design of these
contracts we are able to extract not only the mean market expectation of in°ation but
also some information on the expected likelihood of di®erent in°ation scenarios. In the
following we outline the basic setup of an experimental in°ation forecast market and
show how the data, generated by the market can be used to construct density and mean
forecasts.
3.1. Market admittance
Experimental markets are typically fully computerized. To be allowed to take part in
a market, participants have to register in the market software via Internet. Within the
process of registration the applicants are asked to provide some personal information
which can later be used to analyze the generated market data.
In general, electronic markets are organized as real-money markets, i.e. all transactions
in the market are based on real money.19 In these markets participants initially have to
decide on their personal investments20 which have to be covered by the traders. Thus,
each participant can win or loose money in the market, depending on his or her success
18 Most economists nowadays believe that markets are highly e±cient means of aggregating private
information and revealing them via market prices (see e.g. Beckmann and Werding (1994), p. 517,
Forsythe, Frank, Krishnamurthy and Ross (1995), p. 771, or Forsythe, Rietz and Ross (1999), p. 83.)
According to this view it is the price mechanism through which bits of information, held by individuals
who communicate by no other means, are brought together and shared with one another (see Hayek
(1948,1968)). Following Smith (1982) this strong belief in the abilities of markets to aggregate and dis-
seminate information is nowadays referred to as the "Hayek hypothesis". Experimental work substantiated
this hypothesis (for reviews of the related work see Sunder (1995) or Beckmann and Werding (1994)).
19 In virtual-money markets all participants initially get endowed with the same amount of virtual
money. These funds can be used by the participants to organize market transactions. In virtual-money
markets the participants with the highest returns on investment are typically rewarded by the market
organizer. Thus, di®erent from real-money markets the participants in virtual-money markets bear no
risk of losing money. That is why virtual-money markets typically attract a larger number of traders.
However, this obviously comes at the price of players engaging in more risky strategies, possibly leading
to biased forecasts.
20 Typically investments are restricted due to legislative restrictions.8 Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets
in trading. As soon as the initial investment has been transferred to the market organizer
(typically this is done via cash or bank transfer to a market account) the participant
gets a trader-ID and a password to get access to the market. In addition to that a trader
account for the participant is created and his initial investment is transferred to the
account.
In general, there are no formal restrictions for participation in experimental stock
markets. Technical precondition for taking part in an experimental market is an Internet
connection.
3.2. Market design
The type of market we propose to use is called "winner-takes-all-market". In such a
market a set of binary lock-in options is traded. The underlying of these options is some
measure of in°ation, e.g. CPI in°ation as typically measured and announced by national
statistical institutes. A binary lock-in option21 has a ¯xed, predetermined payo® if the
underlying is inside the strike range at expiration. In experimental forecasting markets
this payo® is typically normalized to one currency unit. The payo® function of such an
option is visualized in ¯gure 2. Thus, the type of lock-in options traded in an in°ation
forecasting market is formally identical to what is called pure, Arrow or Arrow-Debreu
securities in the ¯nancial markets literature.22
The set of binary lock-in options which is traded in the market consists of n di®erent
options. The strike ranges of these options do not overlap and cover the whole range of
possible outcomes of the underlying, i.e. in°ation. Since the number of unique linearly
independent securities is equal to the total number of alternative states of nature we deal
with a complete market.23 Regardless of the initial distribution of securities it is thus
possible to reduce uncertainty about the value of future wealth to zero. A set of options
21 In ¯nancial literature this type of option is also called digital, simplex, all-or-nothing, bet or lottery
option.
22 See e.g. Copeland and Weston (1992) or Eichberger and Harper (1997).








Figure 2. Payo® function of a binary lock-in option on the CPI.
de¯ning a complete market and the related payo® rules are shown in table I. Such a
complete set of options is also called "unit portfolio" or "bundle".
Table I. Complete set of n options.
Contract name Pays o® 1 currency unit, if
¼(k1¡) ¼ < k1
¼(k1;k2) k1 · ¼ < k2
. . .
. . .
¼(kn¡1;kn) kn¡1 · ¼ < kn
¼(kn+) kn ¸ ¼
There is no general rule how much options should be traded and how large the strike
ranges should be. In order not to induce some kind of bias by arbitrary contract design it
seems to be reasonable to center the contracts symmetrically around the last announced
in°ation rate. Experiences from political stock markets show that the number of traded
contracts n should not be too large (· 10) and the strike ranges should not be too
small. Otherwise it will be quite hard for the participants to guess how likely it is that
in°ation will fall into a certain strike range. However, in order to get a forecast as precise10 Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets
as possible the market organizer might be interested in having the possibility to vary
the set of traded options during the market period. This can easily be done by splitting
options into two (or more) contracts with smaller strike ranges (given that the options
do not overlap and all possible outcomes of the underlying are still covered). In order not
to in°uence the values of the participants' portfolios by contract splits, every holder of a
split contract gets one of every newly issued contract in exchange.
3.3. Trading in the market
Upon entering the market and any time thereafter participants can buy unit portfolios
from the market organizer for the price of 1 currency unit until the market closes.
Complete unit portfolios can also be sold back to the market organizer during the market
period for the price of 1 currency unit each. Selling and buying unit portfolios from or to
the market organizer are primary market transactions. Together with the earlier described
payo® structure of the binary lock-in options the pricing of the unit portfolios guarantees
that the market is a zero-sum-game for the market organizer. All initial investments get
paid back to the participants. However, the market is typically no zero sum game for
the individual participant since he can win or loose money, depending on his success in
trading within the secondary market.
On the secondary market participants can buy or sell contracts from or to other
participants. The secondary market is organized as a so-called "double auction market".
Market participants can issue o®ers to buy (bids) or o®ers to sell (asks) contracts. When
using a ¯rst type of transactions, so-called "limit orders", traders have to choose the
order type (bid or ask), the contract type, the number of contracts he wants to trade, the
transaction price and ¯nally the order's expiration date. Limit orders are maintained in
separate bid and ask queues ordered ¯rst by o®er price and then by the time of issuance.
Whenever an o®er enters one of the queues it remains there until is withdrawn by the
trader, reaches its expiration date or is carried out. Orders are carried out whenever bid-
and ask-prices overlap. The second type of transactions, the so-called "market orders",
are orders to buy or sell at current market prices which are carried out immediately.Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets 11
All primary and secondary market transactions are organized via a market software.24
Besides serving as a market platform the software provides several facilities for the traders
to obtain information on the market. A trader can access personal information on his
market account, current portfolio or already submitted orders. The software also delivers
information about the highest bids to buy and lowest asks to sell for each traded contract
type or the last prices for which a certain share was traded.
Di®erent from real world stock markets, short sales and purchases on margin are
typically disallowed to secure the zero-sum game character of experimental forecasting
markets. In addition, there are typically no transaction costs levied by the market or-
ganizer for both, primary and secondary market transactions. The market participants
only have to bear those transaction costs resulting from getting Internet access and
opportunity costs from spending time on trading in the market.
3.4. Market liquidation
A forecasting market gets liquidated as soon as the realization of the underlying is known,
i.e. the in°ation rate is announced by the responsible institution. The individual payo® of
each participant consists of (i) the money the trader held on his market account when the
market closed and (ii) the liquidation value of the portfolio of contracts the trader held
at the end of the market. We might illustrate the liquidation procedure at the example
shown in table II.
Therefore, we assume that the in°ation rate turns out to be in between k2 and k3
percent. The second column in table II shows the individual portfolio of participant j and
the third column the liquidation values of the contracts. The total value of participant j's
portfolio of contracts is thus 13 currency units. Adding the 3 currency units participant
j is assumed to hold on his market account at the end of the market period leads to a
total payo® of 16 currency units.
24 The markets we report on in this paper were organized using two di®erent softwares. However, their
basic features were quite similar.12 Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets
Table II. Portfolio liquidation for an imaginary participant j under the assumption
that the in°ation rate turns out to be in between k2 and k3
Contract/asset Number of contracts in Liquidation value Total value
portfolio of participant j per contract unit in curr. units
¼(k1¡) 76 0 0
¼(k1;k2) 4 0 0
¼(k2;k3) 13 1 13
¼(k3;k4) 2 0 0
¼(k4;k5) 5 0 0
¼(k5+) 0 0 0
Cash on account 3 - 3
Total payo® - - 16
3.5. Density forecast, mean forecast and forecast uncertainty
In order to show how and why the described design of an experimental stock market
should enable us to obtain a reasonable in°ation forecast we argue on the basis of
Arbitrage Pricing Theory.25
According to Arbitrage Pricing Theory26 the equilibrium price of a pure security
principally depends on three factors: the risk-free rate of return, individuals' attitudes
towards risk and expectations as to the probability that a particular state will occur.27
More precisely we can express the price at time t of any pure security as
ps;t =
E[ps;T]
(1 + rf + rr)(T¡t)
with rf being the risk-free rate of return, E[ps;T] the expected payo® of the contract
at time T and rr a risk premium for taking over unsystematic risk (which can not be
diversi¯ed). In order to determine the equilibrium price of the binary lock-in option
traded in a forecasting market we will consider these three determinants sequentially.
Let us ¯rst focus on the risk-free rate of return. There are two risk-free portfolios in an
in°ation forecasting market. The ¯rst one consists of holding any of the pure securities at
25 The same results can principally be derived from Capital Asset Pricing Theory (CAPM). Since
the assumptions of CAPM are somewhat more restrictive than those of Arbitrage Theory we base our
expositions on the latter.
26 Arbitrage Pricing Theory goes back to Ross (1976).
27 Copeland and Weston (1993), p. 116.Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets 13
all. Obviously, the return on this portfolio is zero. The second risk-free portfolio consists
of one of each of the pure securities. Such a portfolio would deliver 1 unit of currency in
every state of the nature. Such a unit portfolio can be purchased from or sold back to
the market organizer at any time during the market period for the price of one currency
unit. Thus, the return on a unit-portfolio is zero by construction. One might be tempted
to argue that the price of a unit-portfolio could be smaller than 1 currency unit when the
sum of asks to sell prices adds up to a smaller value than 1. However, such a situation can
not be an equilibrium since it is not arbitrage-free.28 One might also argue that there is a
signi¯cantly positive risk-free return outside the in°ation market, e.g. when investing into
government bonds. However, once the decision to transfer money to the market account
has been made (what is a necessary precondition to take part in an in°ation market),
the money can not be withdrawn during the market period. Thus, the risk-free rate of
return is zero (rf = 0) in an in°ation forecasting market.
The second determinant of a pure security's price lies in individual beliefs concerning
the relative likelihood of di®erent states s occurring, the so-called state probabilities.
For simplicity, let us assume that in equilibrium individuals agree on the probabilities
h¼(kn¡1;kn);t of the states of nature.29 In that case we can decompose the expected price
of a pure security in state ¼(kn¡1;kn) at time t into the probability of the state occurring
and the price of an expected currency unit contingent on the state occurring. Thus, we
have
E[p¼(kn¡1;kn);T] = h¼(kn¡1;kn);t ¢ 1:
In consequence, expected prices of pure securities di®er to the same degree as market
participants expect di®erent states to occur with di®erent probabilities.
The third determinant of pure securities' prices is market participants' attitude toward
risk. While there are obviously no risk premia for the case of risk-neutral investors, one
28 In the described situation one could easily make sure pro¯ts by buying unit-portfolios on the sec-
ondary market and selling them for the price of 1 currency unit to the market organizer. Realizing these
transactions will quickly eliminate all arbitrage opportunities.
29 This assumption is without e®ect on the line of argument. Principally, subjective beliefs concerning
state probabilities can also di®er (see e.g. Copeland and Weston (1993), p. 117.14 Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets
might argue that risk-averse individuals will demand for such a premium in order to take
over risk. However, this is only true for the case that aggregate wealth di®ers between the
di®erent states of nature.30 In the market setting we suggest to use aggregate wealth is
the same regardless of which state is realized (this is due to the zero-sum game character
of the market). Thus, there is no non-diversi¯able risk and, consequently, equilibrium
prices include no risk premia, i.e. rr = 0.
Altogether, we end up with the following pricing formula for the binary lock-in options
traded in in°ation forecasting markets:
p¼(kn¡1;kn);t =
E[p¼(kn¡1;kn);T]
(1 + rf + rr)(T¡t)
=
h¼(kn¡1;kn);t ¢ 1
(1 + 0 + 0)(T¡t)
= h¼(kn¡1;kn);t:
Thus, the prices of the pure securities traded in an in°ation market are perfect predictors
of the probabilities, market participants attach to the di®erent states of nature. However,
this is true only if the market is in equilibrium. It is then when all available information
is re°ected in the current market prices.31 Since current market prices do not always sum
up to unity in practice32 a normalization procedure is typically applied. This is necessary
in order to be able to interpret the market prices as probabilities.
While an experimental in°ation forecasting market directly generates a density fore-
cast of in°ation it does not automatically deliver some form of mean in°ation forecast.
Whenever we are in need of mean forecasts we have to make some simplifying assumptions
on the distribution of in°ation expectations within the intervals as marked by the strike
ranges of the option contracts. For su±ciently small intervals it seems to be reasonable
30 See e.g. Copeland and Weston (1993), p. 118.
31 There is still a lack of a commonly accepted dynamic model how the market participants learn from
the observed market prices, i.e. how exactly the process of aggregating disseminated information works.
Although one might be able to build such a model it will be hard to test it empirically since the necessary
data on individual beliefs are hard to obtain. One might also be somewhat sceptic whether a formal
behavioral model will be able to capture the diversities of individual learning.
32 Note that there will be no additional trades when all market participants have the same expectation
on the density function of in°ation. Thus, the trading process might stop although not all information
is included in the market prices. However, in markets with a large number of traders this phenomenon
typically diminishes.Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets 15
to assume that the market participants expect all realizations of in°ation within this
interval to be equally likely. In this case the interval can be represented by its class
middle. However, a complete set of options includes two options with in¯nitely large
strike ranges (¼(k1¡) and ¼(k5+) in the example in table I). To deal with this problem
one might use the (upper respectively the lower) bounds of these in¯nitely large intervals
instead of the class middles.33 We can then calculate the mean market in°ation forecast
¼
f
t at time t by multiplying the normalized, last observed market prices with the class

























Pt := p¼(k1¡);t + ::: + p¼(kn+);t:
In the literature on political stock markets often daily volume-weighted prices are used
for generating forecasts instead of last observed prices. While only marginal prices can
be expected to include all available information we therefore also report forecasts which
are based on normalized weighted prices.
By far most published in°ation forecasts are mean forecasts. Typically these forecasts
do not provide any information on the underlying probabilities of di®erent in°ation
scenarios. Since one and the same mean forecast can principally be constructed by many
di®erent probability distributions information about the uncertainty surrounding a mean
in°ation forecast is important in addition to the forecast itself. A measure of forecast
uncertainty helps to qualify a forecast and is useful to give a richer picture of the expected
range of likely outcomes.34 In°ation forecasting markets allow to assess the mean in°ation
forecast's uncertainty directly. Since the normalized market prices pn
t;j can be interpreted
33 Doing so is obviously problematic when the observed prices for the options covering the in¯nitely
large intervals are quite high. However the market administrator can lower the market prices of these
intervals by making use of the earlier described split option of contracts.
34 See e.g. Ericsson (2001), p. 88-89.16 Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets
as the market's aggregated evaluation of the probabilities of di®erent in°ation scenarios,
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t )2:
It should be underlined that experimental markets allow to construct forecasts and to
assess their empirical variance at any point in time during the market period. Thus, exper-
imental forecasting markets deliver time-series of ¯xed-event forecasts of the underlying
of the traded contracts.35
4. Results from pilot forecasting markets
In this section we report and analyze the results from a series of 5 prototype forecasting
markets conducted in Germany. While these forecasting markets di®ered in some respects,
they all made use of the basic design developed in the previous section. The ¯rst 4 markets
we report on were designed to directly forecast CPI in°ation. The 5th market focusses
on a policy instrument rather than a policy outcome. In this market we tried to assess
market expectations on the future development of main re¯nancing rate (MRR) of the
European Central Bank (ECB).
4.1. Market descriptions
We start out with a brief description of the pilot markets.36 Table III summarizes the
main characteristics of the 5 experimental forecasting markets.
The ¯rst market ("market I") was organized at Dresden University of Technology
(Germany) in close cooperation with the Iowa Electronic Markets (United States). The
35 The presented market design is also suitable to generate forecasts for macroeconomic variables like
unemployment rates or gross national products.
36 For a more detailed description of the market features see the appendix.Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets 17
Table III. Overview on pilot forecasting markets.
Market nr. Underlying Market period participants Investment per trader
I CPI in°ation Feb 2001 20.10.00-13.03.01 44 23.22 Euro
II CPI in°ation Dec 2001 17.10.01-15.01.02 32 12.94 Euro
III CPI in°ation Jun 2002 23.4.02-11.7.02 47 17.87 Euro
IV CPI in°ation Oct 2002 26.07.02-12.11.02 36 8.00 Euro
V ECB MRR 15.1.03 13.10.02-14.01.03 31 virtual money
market was designed to forecast the German February 2001 CPI in°ation rate. It opened
up on 20th October 2000 and was closed on 14th March 2001, soon after February
2001 CPI in°ation was announced on 10th March. All transactions were based on real
money. Altogether, 44 traders participated in the market, most of which were students of
economics and business administration at Dresden University of Technology. While the
market was principally open to all interested people, the market was advertised primarily
in economics courses at Dresden University of Technology. The total amount of money
invested was 1021.62 Euro (23.22 Euro per trader).
The second market ("market II") was conducted by Dresden Electronic Markets
(DEM) at Dresden University of Technology. The CPI in°ation rate to be forecasted was
the one of December 2001 in Germany. The market opened on 17th October 2001 and
closed on 15th January 2002. Altogether, 32 traders took part in the market most of which
were again students of economics and business administration at Dresden University of
Technology. Again the market was principally open to all interested people. The sum of
investments was 414 Euro (12.94 Euro per trader).
Market organizer of the third market ("market III") was again Dresden University
of Technology. The market was designed to forecast the June 2002 CPI in°ation rate
in Germany. The trading period begun on 23rd April and ended on 11th July 2002. A
total number of 47 traders enrolled in the market most of which were again students of
economics and business administration at Dresden University of Technology. However, a
considerable number of people outside the university took part in the market. The sum
of investments was 841 Euro (on average 17.87 Euro per trader).18 Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets
The last German in°ation forecasting market ("market IV") we report on was again
organized by Dresden Electronic Markets. The market was designed to forecast the
October 2002 CPI in°ation rate in Germany. The trading period begun on 26th July
and ended on 12th November 2002. A total number of 36 traders took part in the market
most of which were identical to the traders in market III. The sum of investments was
288 Euro (on average 8.00 Euro per trader).
A natural alternative to forecasting macroeconomic outcomes as in°ation rates is to
forecast a central bank's use of its monetary instruments. In order to test in how far
experimental markets are capable of assessing the use of monetary policy instruments we
conducted an additional market on the main re¯nancing rate of the European Central
Bank (ECB) on 15th January 2003 ("market V"). The market opened up on 13th October
2002 and closed on 14th January 2003. Di®erent from the 4 in°ation forecasting markets
described earlier in this chapter the ECB market was organized as a virtual money
market. Thus, all transactions in the market were done on a virtual money basis. Initially,
every trader was endowed with 100 virtual Euro he could use for trading in the market.
The three market participants realizing the highest returns on investment were rewarded
with 75, 50 and 25 Euro. Altogether, 31 traders were engaged in the market, most of
which were again students.
4.2. Mean forecasts and forecast uncertainty
As discussed earlier experimental forecasting markets allow to obtain actual density or
mean forecasts at any point in time during the market period. Thus, for every of the four
prototype markets we end up with a time series of forecasts ¼
f
T;T¡t of the same event,
i.e. the underlying of the traded contracts ¼T at time T. Thus, we deal with so-called
¯xed-event forecasts.37
While we principally can construct mean forecasts of any frequency we work on the
basis of daily forecasts since new information on in°ation or the main re¯nancing rate is
typically not arriving more often than once a day, if at all. For every market we report
37 Clements and Hendry (1998).Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets 19
two types of forecasts. The ¯rst forecast, which we will call "last traded prices forecast"
(LTP) is based on the prices of the last observed transaction for every contract type
at midnight. The second forecast, the so-called "average traded prices forecast" (ATP)
is calculated on the basis of the volume-weighted daily average price of every type of
contract. When there were no transactions on a certain day, the forecast remains on the
previous day's value.
Experiences with previous markets showed that it typically takes several days before
trading in the markets begins. On the one hand this is due to the time lag between
applying for admittance for a market and transfer of the initial investment on the market
account. On the other hand the number of traders in the market is quite low in the
beginning of every market, leading to relatively few and unrealistic o®ers placed in the
market queues. We therefore report forecasts not before every contract type has been
traded in the market at least once.
As an example, we report the mean market forecasts for ECB's main re¯nancing rate
in the following.38 During the market period the main re¯nancing rate was changed once.
On 6th December 2002 the rate was lowered by 0.5 percent from 3.25 to 2.75 percent. In
¯gure 3 we show the time series of ¯xed-event forecasts of the ECB main re¯nancing rate
as derived from market V. It is easy to see that the market performed quite well. From
the beginning of the market period on the market predicted a decreasing main re¯nancing
rate. Initially the market predicted a decrease by some 0.25 percent. However, well before
the re¯nancing rate was in fact lowered the market forecast further decreased to around
2.90 percent indicating that ECB might take two steps down on the ladder. After the
factual change of the re¯nancing rate on 6th December the market forecast converged
quickly to 2.75 percent and remained there until the market closed.
One of the major advantages of using experimental markets to forecast in°ation is
that forecasting markets deliver important information on the uncertainty surrounding
the mean forecast. This is due to the fact that experimental in°ation markets not only
38 Charts for the time series of mean in°ation forecasts derived from markets I-IV are included in the
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Figure 3. Mean forecast of ECB's main re¯nancing rate on 15th January 2003.
allow to construct mean forecasts of in°ation but also deliver important information
on the likelihood of alternative in°ation scenarios. As explained earlier, the uncertainty
surrounding the mean forecast can easily be assessed by calculating the empirical variance
of the forecast.
Since in°ation is a somewhat sticky variable, we should expect the empirical variance of
the forecasts to decrease throughout the market period. In ¯gure 4 we show the variances
of the mean in°ation forecasts (LTP) during the market periods.
In fact, there seems to be a decreasing tendency of the empirical variance during the
market periods. In order to test for time trends in the forecast variances formally we run
OLS-regressions of the type
¾2
t = c + ® ¢ t + ²t
for every market (c is the regression constant and ²t the unexplained residual). The
existence of a negative time trend implies the coe±cient ® of the time variable t to
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Figure 4. Variances of daily mean in°ation forecast (LTP).
negative time trends of the forecast variances for all pilot in°ation forecasting markets
as well as for the ECB-market.39
Table IV. Time trends of in°ation forecast variances (LTP).
Market Constant T-statistic Probability Trend T-statistic Probability Obs.
market I 0.377 15.28 0.00 -0.001 -4.29 0.00 138
market II 0.169 25.25 0.00 -0.002 -12.35 0.00 83
market III 0.165 31.17 0.00 -0.002 -16.32 0.00 72
market IV 0.173 28.75 0.00 -0.001 -8.28 0.00 111
market V 0.102 27.25 0.00 -0.003 -9.23 0.00 90
4.3. Forecast efficiency
Of course, the kind of anecdotal evidence from our pilot markets reported in the previous
subsection is insu±cient to prove that forecasts generated by experimental forecasting
markets are of su±ciently high quality to be used in practice. In order to be able to study
the forecasting accuracy of in°ation forecasts derived from experimental markets we are
39 We should note that the results for market I are primarily driven by the excessively high variance
in the ¯rst days of the active trading period. When excluding the ¯rst week of market activity the time
trend is still negative but insigni¯cant.22 Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets
obviously in need of a larger number of cross-section observations which are presently not
available.40 However, forecasting markets can be expected to deliver high quality forecasts
only if the markets incorporate newly arriving information in an e±cient manner. Thus,
instead of analyzing the accuracy of the market forecasts we study in how far the time
series of ¯xed event forecasts as derived from the pilot markets are e±cient.
In order to answer this question we make use of the concept of testing for weak
e±ciency proposed by Nordhaus (1987). Up to now, this concept has rarely been applied
to in°ation forecasts. One might suggest this to be due to the fact that most existing
time series of in°ation forecasts are not ¯xed but rolling event forecasts. One of the
rare tests for e±ciency of a ¯xed event time series of price forecasts was conducted by
Nordhaus (1987) himself. When analyzing a time series of oil price forecasts collected
by Data Resources Inc. he ¯nds signi¯cant autocorrelation of forecast revisions. Nord-
haus also reports the results of weak e±ciency tests of 3 additional time series of ¯xed
event forecasts (forecasts of nuclear capacity, energy forecasts and real GNP forecasts).
Similarly, the forecast revisions turn out to be autocorrelated. Nordhaus interprets his
¯nding that most of the signi¯cant autocorrelations are positive as an indication that
the hypothesis of social psychologists that people tend to hold on to prior views too long
(see Tversky and Kahneman (1981)) might be correct.
Recently Bakhshi, Kapetanios and Yates (2003) studied the e±ciency of 7 time series
of ¯xed event in°ation forecasts. The forecasts were constructed by Meryll Lynch from a
survey of about 70 fund managers. Respondents had to predict the annual increase in the
U.K. Retail Price Index at December 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997 and the annual increase
in the U.K. RPIX index at December 1998, 1999 and 2000. The surveys were conducted
monthly providing a database of 23 forecasts per event. Bakhshi, Kapetanios and Yates
reject the hypothesis that the forecast errors are uncorrelated with past revisions for
5 out of 7 time series of ¯xed event forecasts. Similarly 2 of the time series exhibit
autocorrelation of forecast revisions.
40 For a study of forecasting accuracy of political stock markets see Berlemann and Schmidt (2001).Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets 23
The major problem of the studies by Nordhaus (1987) and Bakhshi, Kapetanios and
Yates (2003) is the relatively low number of observations per time series of ¯xed event
forecasts. The time series generated by experimental forecasting markets are considerably
longer since they principally allow to generate continuous in°ation forecasts. Thus, these
time series provide an excellent database to study the e±ciency of the forecasts.
We start out with analyzing in how far the forecast errors constructed by market
prices are correlated with past forecast revisions. We therefore run the OLS regression
x¿ ¡ x
f








t¡3) + ²t; (1)
with x being the variable to be forecasted. The results are shown in table V. For all
markets and all forecasts we ¯nd a highly signi¯cant constant indicating that the forecasts
are biased. However, di®erent from tests on rationality of rolling event forecasts, such
a bias is no sign of ine±ciency of ¯xed event forecasts. None of the forecasts shows
signi¯cant ¯rst- or second-order correlation with past forecast revisions. Thus, they all
pass the ¯rst test on e±ciency.
In a second test of e±ciency we study in how far the forecast revisions are autocorre-









t¡2) + ²t: (2)
The results for both LTP and ATP forecasts are reported in table VI. For none of the
forecasts we ¯nd signi¯cant positive41 ¯rst-order correlation, indicating that the market
forecasts incorporate newly arriving information in an e±cient manner.
Altogether, the results indicate that the markets were quite e±cient in disseminating
information. One might be somewhat optimistic therefore that experimental markets are
capable of generating high quality in°ation forecasts.
41 We should note that we found a signi¯cantly negative coe±cient for the ATP forecast in market
1. However, since the coe±cient is negative the reason for this can hardly be that traders stick to their
expectations for too long.24 Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets
Table V. Correlation between forecast errors and past forecast
revisions.









ype (t-value) (t-value) (t-value)
Market I LTP -0.45 0.45 0.31
(¡48:62)
¤¤ (2:32) (1.63)
Market I ATP -0.44 0.38 0.14
(¡46:20)
¤¤ (2:13) (0.83)
Market II LTP 0.29 0.69 0.64
(11:20)
¤¤ (1.44) (1.36)
Market II ATP 0.28 0.95 0.91
(11:62)
¤¤ (1.48) (1.46)
Market III LTP 0.59 0.42 0.40
(16:95)
¤¤ (0.50) (0.47)
Market III ATP 0.60 0.45 0.49
(16:76)
¤¤ (0.48) (0.52)
Market IV LTP -0.24 0.54 0.50
(¡16:18)
¤¤ (0.98) (0.90)
Market IV ATP -0.24 0.55 0.49
(¡16:30)
¤¤ (0.96) (0.86)
Market V LTP 0.19 -1.22 -1.54
(6:83)
¤¤ (-1.01) (-1.27)
Market V ATP 0.17 -1.18 -1.53
(6:11)
¤¤ (-0.85) (-1.10)
¤¤ signi¯cant on a 99%-con¯dence-level
¤ signi¯cant on a 95%-con¯dence-level
4.4. Forecast distribution and further applications
It was already shown that experimental in°ation forecasting markets allow to calculate
a mean forecast and its variance (or standard deviation) at any point in time during the
market period. In addition, for any point in time we can visualize the market's actual
evaluation of the probability of di®erent in°ation realizations in a histogram. We might
illustrate this at the example of data from the February 2001 in°ation market. In ¯gure
5 we show the empirical distribution of the February 2001 LTP in°ation forecast of 12th
December 2000. For every contract we have one observation which refers to the last
observed transactions.
An inspection of the histogram suggests that in°ation expectations might be normally
distributed. When extending the inspection to a larger number of days at di®erent pointsForecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets 25
Table VI. First-order autocorrelation of forecast revisions.





Market I LTP 0.12 1.39 0.17
Market I ATP -0.18 -2.22 0:03
¤
Market II LTP 0.12 1.10 0.27
Market II ATP -0.03 -0.32 0.75
Market III LTP -0.06 -0.49 0.63
Market III ATP -0.14 -1.18 0.24
Market IV LTP 0.04 0.40 0.69
Market IV ATP 0.05 0.51 0.61
Market V LTP 0.12 1.23 0.22
Market V ATP 0.17 1.67 0:09
¤¤ signi¯cant on a 99%-con¯dence-level


















































Figure 5. Distribution of February 2001 in°ation forecast on 12th December 2000.
in time during the market period and to the other markets this suggestion is substanti-
ated. However, because of the relatively low number of observations per forecast we are
not able to test for this hypothesis formally.
Obviously, knowing the distributional form of the market in°ation forecasts would
be highly valuable since we would be able to make more precise statements about the26 Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets
probability of di®erent in°ation scenarios. Knowledge on the distributional form of the
forecast together with our empirical assessment of its mean and variance would enable
us (i) to calculate the probability for every in°ation scenario that might be of interest,
even if no contract in the market has been traded for the referring interval and (ii) to
construct forecast con¯dence intervals.
5. Summary and outlook
Altogether our experiences with the reported pilot forecasting markets reinforced our
initial expectation that experimental markets are a highly useful forecasting tool not only
for political events as elections but also for realizations of macroeconomic variables like
in°ation. Given the relatively low number of participants with comparably low degrees
of information the markets performed quite well and delivered not only reasonable mean
forecasts of in°ation but also valuable information on the probability of di®erent in°ation
scenarios. However, to substantiate our view that experimental markets can ¯ll a gap
in existing forecasting techniques many additional markets have to be conducted and
evaluated.42
It would be an interesting task to run and evaluate experimental forecasting markets
with longer time-horizons, such as one or even several years. However, to organize and
conduct medium- or long-term in°ation forecasting markets is not too easy because of at
least two reasons. First, the markets can not be liquidated before the event, the market
is conducted on, has realized. Thus, when running a forecasting market on the two-year
ahead in°ation rate, what is technically possible, the market participants receive their
payo®s after the same period of time. While the market organizer could invest the initial
investments in some interest bearing asset and pay some interest on the payo®s it is
nevertheless not easy to motivate participants to take part in a market with such a long
time horizon. Second, when running medium- but especially long-term markets a high
42 We should remind of the fact that it took about ten years of experimental markets research before ¯rst
empirical cross-section studies of the relative performance of political stock markets could be conducted.
See e.g. Berlemann and Schmidt (2001) and Berg, Forsythe and Rietz (1997).Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets 27
degree of con¯dence between the market organizer and the market participants is neces-
sary. Thus, there has to be some institutional background guaranteeing the liquidation
procedure.
In order to motivate traders to engage even in medium-term markets one could com-
bine short-term markets with medium-term ones. First experiences with such a staggered
system of forecasting markets have been made in a series of markets conducted throughout
2002 in Bulgaria.43 The fact that almost all traders engaged in the short-term markets,
also took part in the medium-term markets is quite promising. Thus, building up a
regular forecasting system allowing for both short-term and medium-term forecasts seems
to be a fruitful task. Doing so would allow to evaluate the forecasts constructed from
experimental forecasting markets in a more systematic way.
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Appendix
A. Unit portfolios
Table VII shows the unit portfolio used in market I. There were initially eight binary
lock-in options in the market. On November 22, the contract "¼(2:0¡2:5)" was split into
two contracts "¼(2:0 ¡ 2:25)" and "¼(2:25 ¡ 2:5)". Therefore, each participant who held
former "¼(2:0 ¡ 2:5)"-contracts in his portfolio was endowed with the same number of
the two new contracts. Thus, the expected value of the participants' portfolios was not
in°uenced by the contract split. The contract split was done because it was observed that
the former "¼(2:0¡2:5)"-contract had been traded for quite high prices, thus indicating
that the participants attached a high probability to the event that the in°ation rate
would have been in between 2.0 and 2.5 percent.
The unit portfolios of markets II-IV are shown in tables VIII-X.
Table VII. Traded contracts in market I.
Contract number Contract name Interval middle/limit Pays o® 1 Euro, if
1 ¼(0:0¡) 0.000 ¼ < 0:0
2 ¼(0:0 ¡ 1:5) 0.750 0:0 · ¼ < 1:5
3 ¼(1:5 ¡ 2:0) 1.750 1:5 · ¼ < 2:0
4 ¼(2:0 ¡ 2:5) 2.250 2:0 · ¼ < 2:5
5 ¼(2:5 ¡ 3:0) 2.750 2:5 · ¼ < 3:0
6 ¼(3:0 ¡ 3:5) 3.250 3:0 · ¼ < 3:5
7 ¼(3:5 ¡ 4:0) 3.750 3:5 · ¼ < 4:0
8 ¼(4:0+) 4.000 4:0 · ¼Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets 31
Table VIII. Traded contracts in market II.
Contract number Contract name Interval middle/limit Pays o® 1 Euro, if
1 ¼(1:0¡) 1.000 ¼ < 1:0
2 ¼(1:0 ¡ 1:5) 1.250 1:0 · ¼ < 1:5
3 ¼(1:5 ¡ 1:75) 1.625 1:5 · ¼ < 1:75
4 ¼(1:75 ¡ 2:0) 1.875 1:75 · ¼ < 2:0
5 ¼(2:0 ¡ 2:5) 2.250 2:0 · ¼ < 2:5
6 ¼(2:5 ¡ 3:0) 2.750 2:5 · ¼ < 3:0
7 ¼(3:0 ¡ 3:5) 3.250 3:0 · ¼ < 3:5
8 ¼(3:5+) 3.500 3:5 · ¼
Table IX. Traded contracts in market III.
Contract number Contract name Interval middle/limit Pays o® 1 Euro, if
1 ¼(1:0¡) 1.000 ¼ < 1:0
2 ¼(1:0 ¡ 1:25) 1.125 1:0 · ¼ < 1:25
3 ¼(1:25 ¡ 1:5) 1.375 1:25 · ¼ < 1:5
4 ¼(1:5 ¡ 1:75) 1.625 1:5 · ¼ < 1:75
5 ¼(1:75 ¡ 2:0) 1.875 1:75 · ¼ < 2:0
6 ¼(2:0 ¡ 2:25) 2.125 2:0 · ¼ < 2:25
7 ¼(2:25 ¡ 2:5) 2.375 2:25 · ¼ < 2:5
8 ¼(2:5 ¡ 3:0) 2.750 2:5 · ¼ < 3:0
9 ¼(3:0 ¡ 4:0) 3.500 3:0 · ¼ < 4:0
10 ¼(4:0+) 4.000 4:0 · ¼
Table X. Traded contracts in market IV.
Contract number Contract name Interval middle/limit Pays o® 1 Euro, if
1 ¼(0:0¡) 0.000 ¼ < 0:0
2 ¼(0:0 ¡ 0:5) 0.250 0:0 · ¼ < 0:5
3 ¼(0:5 ¡ 0:75) 0.625 0:5 · ¼ < 0:75
4 ¼(0:75 ¡ 1:00) 0.875 0:75 · ¼ < 1:00
5 ¼(1:00 ¡ 1:25) 1.125 1:00 · ¼ < 1:25
6 ¼(1:25 ¡ 1:75) 1.500 1:25 · ¼ < 1:75
7 ¼(1:75 ¡ 2:25) 2.000 1:75 · ¼ < 2:25
8 ¼(2:25+) 2.250 2:25 · ¼32 Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets
Table XI. Traded contracts in ECB market.
Contract number Contract name Interval middle/limit Pays o® 1 virtual Euro, if
1 r(2:25¡) 2.250 r · 2:25
2 r(2:50) 2.500 r = 2:50
3 r(2:75) 2.750 r = 2:75
4 r(3:00) 3.000 r = 3:00
5 r(3:25) 3.250 r = 3:25
6 r(3:50) 3.500 r = 3:50
7 r(3:75) 3.750 r = 3:75
8 r(4:00) 4.000 r = 4:00
9 r(4:25+) 4.250 r ¸ 4:25
The contracts traded in market V are shown in table XI. The contracts were designed
symmetrically around the main re¯nancing rate prevailing when the market opened up
(3.25 percent). To understand the design of contracts it should be noted that the main
re¯nancing rate is varied only by multiples of 0.25 percent.Forecasting in°ation via experimental stock markets 33
B. Mean forecasts
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Figure 9. Mean in°ation forecast for October 2002.   
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